The Benefit of Surveillance and the Principle of Appellate Restraint

Bullock v Wraight [2026] QCA 176
October 6 2026

By David Slatyer, Partner and Ellene Eliadis, Paralegal

The Appellant commenced proceedings in the District Court seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on 9 December 2021. Liability was admitted.

As such, the key issues at trial were the nature and extent of the Appellant’s injuries, and the proper assessment of damages. In her judgment,[1] Balic J accepted that the Appellant sustained thoracic spine, shoulder and psychiatric injuries. However, relying on surveillance footage, inconsistencies in the Appellant’s self-reporting to medical practitioners, and other documentary evidence, her Honour found that the Appellant had exaggerated the severity of her ongoing symptoms and functional limitations.

Accordingly, despite claiming damages more than $510,000, the Appellant was only awarded $34,858.27.

The Appellant was required by s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) to seek leave to appeal, which was refused.

Issue

The Appellant contended that Balic J erred in five respects:

  • failing to apply the rule in Browne v Dunn;[2]
  • rejecting the evidence of Mr Lee, forensic accountant;
  • rejecting the evidence of Mr Keightley, occupational therapist;
  • failing to assess general damages in accordance with the Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld); and
  • making findings of fact that were wrong by “incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony” or were “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.

Judgment

Bond JA, with whom Mullins P and Boddice JA agreed, dismissed the application.

Bond JA observed that an appellate court must exercise considerable restraint when asked to interfere with findings of fact made by a trial judge, particularly where those findings are informed by assessments of the credibility and reliability of witnesses.[3]

In relation to the first alleged error, the Appellant contended that the rule in Browne v Dunn had been breached because: (1) the surveillance footage was not put to her orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Shaw, by the Respondents, (2) she was not cross-examined on the proposition that her injuries had resolved, and (3) Balic J relied upon Linkt toll records without giving her an opportunity to comment on that evidence. Bond JA rejected those submissions. His Honour held that the Appellant was at liberty to put the surveillance material to Dr Shaw but chose not to do so. In those circumstances, it was open to Balic J to conclude that the surveillance footage undermined the factual assumptions upon which Dr Shaw’s opinions were based. His Honour further found that the Appellant had, in fact, been cross-examined regarding the nature and extent of her alleged injuries and the resulting disabilities. In relation to the Linkt toll records, Bond JA noted that the Appellant had been questioned about her driving and social activities. In any event, his Honour considered that the toll evidence played a limited role in Balic J’s ultimate decision.

The second and third alleged errors related to Balic J’s rejection of certain expert evidence. Bond JA observed that the opinions of Mr Keightley and Mr Lee depended substantially upon the Appellant’s self-reporting of her symptoms. Once Balic J found that the Appellant had exaggerated the extent and duration of her limitations, the strength of those opinions was significantly weakened. In those circumstances, it was open to Balic J to place limited weight upon the experts’ opinions and to prefer other evidence.

The fourth alleged error concerned the assessment of the Appellant’s Injury Scale Value. Pursuant to the Civil Liability Regulations, the Court was required to identify the dominant injury for the purpose of assessing general damages. Balic J identified the Appellant’s shoulder injury as the dominant injury. The Appellant contended that her cervical spine injury should instead have been selected. Bond JA accepted that there may have been some force in that argument and that the trial judge may have erred in identifying the dominant injury. However, his Honour concluded that any such error was immaterial. The alternative categorisation would not have altered the overall damages assessment in any significant way.

The fifth alleged error was that Balic J made a number of factual errors. Bond JA rejected that submission, finding that each of the impugned findings was supported by the evidence before the Court.

Accordingly, the Appellant failed to establish any legal error of sufficient substance to justify the grant of leave to appeal.

Implications

This decision reinforces the principle of appellate restraint. The Court emphasised that an appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings unless the judge has “failed to use or…palpably misused [his or her] advantage”.[4] Mere disagreement with factual findings or the assessment of damages will not provide a sufficient basis for the grant of leave to appeal.

The primary decision shows that surveillance of an injured plaintiff remains a legitimate factual inquiry that can undermine the plaintiff’s case.

 

[1] [2025] QDC 85.

[2] Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67.

[3] See Wang v Hur [2024] QCA 126 at [23]-[24].

[4] Ibid.